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Abstract
We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations
on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard
and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages,
(ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts,
(iii) how these incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship be-
tween contract duration and performance also depends on the legal system. With one
exception, all theoretical results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data
set from the top German Soccer League ("Bundesliga").
Key words: regulation of labor markets, long-term contracts, sports economics, breach
of contract, empirical contract theory.
1 Introduction
Motivation In recent years, there has been an ongoing controversy in the economic and
legal profession whether the freedom of contract should be restricted when two parties
want to agree on binding long-term agreements. Examples include exclusive dealing
clauses, long-term (labor) contracts precluding unilateral termination, and excessively
high damage clauses for breach of contract.
Following the general lines of the early Chicago School, Stigler (1975, Ch. 7) argued
that restricting the set of feasible contracts can never increase social welfare, because
parties will not sign inferior contracts. However, modern contract theory has identified a
variety of reasons why binding long-term agreements may be privately optimal but socially
unwarranted. One argument is that the contracting parties may deliberately accept
inefficiencies as to reduce the payoff of third parties. In these cases, the inefficiencies may
be mitigated by appropriate restrictions on the freedom of contract (see the literature
discussion below).
Although the theoretical literature provides many interesting insights, there is a lack
of empirical evidence. This is owing to the fact that an empirical analysis requires the
following conditions to be simultaneously fulfilled, which is rarely the case: i) the terms
of the contracts must be observable or at least reconstructible, ii) there has been a change
in the legal regime which generates some variation of the relevant contract terms, and
iii) the sample must be representative and sufficiently large to allow for the results to be
generalized.
In the present paper, we perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of
transfer fee regulations for professional soccer players in Europe. This is an appropriate
field of application since the legal regimes governing the transfers of players in Europe
have been changed dramatically in recent years, and because we were able to collect
contract and performance data for 1308 player years in the German Bundesliga from
time periods where different legal regimes were in force.
Our paper aims at contributing to three lines of research. With respect to sports
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economics, we are (to the best of our knowledge) the first to apply a coherent modeling
approach to analyze the impact of changes in the legal environment in European soccer
and to use a rich data set to test the predictions empirically. As for contract theory, we
consider as interesting the theoretical analysis and empirical confirmation of the interplay
between heterogeneity and moral hazard. Finally, our analysis sheds light on the impact
of legal restrictions on economic variables such as the contract length, salaries, transfer
fees actually paid and performance.
Legal situation Before turning to a description of our analysis, we need to provide
some brief background knowledge on transfer fee regulations in European soccer. Up
to 1995, the most important regulation was that a club could demand a transfer fee
which was administered by the national soccer associations even if a player’s contract
had already expired. These fees were supposed to stabilize the league’s competitive
balance, and were therefore increasing in the strength of the new club and decreasing in
the strength of the old club.1 We label this regime the ”pre-Bosman regime” P . Under
regime P , clubs and players were not able to agree credibly upon a contract where a
player could leave for free when the contract had expired.
In the famous ”Bosman Case” in December 1995, the European Court of Justice ruled
that this transfer system was not in accordance with article 39 of the Treaty of Rome,
because it was judged to hamper the mobility of professionals.2 Since then, clubs are no
longer entitled to receive transfer fees for out-of-contract players. The verdict did not
restrict the transfer fees for players with valid contracts.3 We will refer to this situation
as to the ”Bosman regime” B.
Recently, even regime B was challenged by EU Competition Commissioner Mario
Monti by pointing to ordinary labor market relationships where firms and employees are
1It is somewhat unclear whether this aim has ever been achieved, see e.g. the survey article by
Szymanski (2003) who also discusses the literature on the impact of the comparable "reserve clause"-
system used in US sports.
2See Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C-415/93.
3Another aspect of the judgement was concerned with the admissible number of foreign players in a
team, which is not at issue here.
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usually not allowed to agree upon any contract length and any transfer fee they want to. In
general, ”unreasonably” high buy-out-fees are usually declared void in court. According
to a compromise between the Commission and the governing bodies of European Soccer,
FIFA and UEFA reached in March 2001, a player can leave his current club without the
club’s approval when paying a fee for breach of contract and, depending on his age, a fee
for compensation of educational expenses. This is in sharp contrast to regimes P and
B, where the old club could always impede the transfer if it did not want to accept the
transfer fee offered by another club as long as the players contract had not yet expired.
Summing up, by appropriately varying the contract length, any transfer fee the player
and his club want to agree upon can be implemented under regime B (”freedom of con-
tract”). To the contrary, regime M imposes an upper bound on the implementable
transfer fee which is equal to the sum of the fee for breach of contract and the compensa-
tion payment for the education of the player. In a similar vein, regime P imposes a lower
bound on the implementable transfer fee, which is equal to what the old club is entitled
to after the player’s contract has expired.
Framework and main results To compare the three regimes, we develop a model
where a club and a player sign a contract containing a wage and a contract length. We
assume that the player’s average productivity is the higher, i) the higher his potential and
ii) the shorter his (remaining) contract length. While the first assumption is straightfor-
ward, as for the second one, note that less than 10% of the average player’s annual salary
is performance related (see Ziebs (2002, pp. 156-167)) and therefore, this is the simplest
way of expressing that a player has lower effort incentives when he has a long-term con-
tract anyway.4 For our purpose, all that matters is that to a large extent, wages are
not tied too closely to actual performance and that this reduces effort incentives. Since
4Note that players can be observed on the pitch week by week which suggests that some performance
measures such as goals scored would be readily available. However, one possible explanation why wages
do not depend too strongly on verifiable measures could be given by using a multi-tasking argument à
la Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992): Since soccer is a team sport and each player has
multiple tasks to fulfill, incentive pay which conditions on verifiable tasks like scoring goals may well
lead a player to neglect other tasks like defending, which are equally important but much more difficult
to verify.
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there is a (stochastic) relationship between the unobservable effort decision of a player
and his observed actual performance, a player’s actual performance tends to fall short of
this potential maximum performance. Under slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to
this as a moral hazard problem which clearly tends to become the more severe, the longer
a player’s contract lasts.
After having signed his contract, the player plays for his initial club unless an exoge-
nous shock leads to higher productivity in another club. For instance, this other club may
have hired a coach who prefers a tactical system in which the player fits extraordinary
well. All we need is that there is a positive probability that a change of clubs is efficient
within the total career horizon, which is clearly the case in reality. Since the potential
of players is known in our model, the renegotiation process between the clubs and the
player is efficient and results in a transfer whenever the productivity shock occurs. It
follows that the contract length and the regime affect the division of surplus, but they
will not directly influence the allocation of players. Note that legally administered or
contractually fixed transfer fees are veto sums the initial club is entitled to, and thus
establish upper bounds on the transfer fees actually paid. In the renegotiation stage, we
assume (and confirm empirically) that the initial club benefits from a high veto sum and
a high contract length, whereas the renegotiation payoffs of the player and the new club
are both weakly decreasing in these arguments.
Our main results, however, refer to the impact of transfer fee regulations on the initial
contract. We show that clubs and players indeed have an incentive to accept inefficiencies
caused by long-term labor contracts to reduce the payoff of third parties. These incentives
strongly depend on the different legal restrictions of transfer fees. In particular, when
signing the initial contract, the player and the club face the following trade-off: on the
one hand, a shorter contract reduces the moral hazard problem, thereby leading to a
higher performance. But on the other hand, shorter contracts increase the new club’s
renegotiation payoff, which ceteris paribus reduces the expected joint payoff of the player
and his initial club. In the initial contract, the club and the player are trying to balance
these countervailing effects at the margin. The crucial point is that the distribution of
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renegotiation payoffs does not only depend on the (remaining) contract length, but also
on the transfer system. This feature drives our results, and leads to a higher contract
length under regime B compared to regimes P and M . Furthermore, we show that the
impact of the contract length on the initial wage and the transfer fee actually paid is
maximum under regime B.
Our last and presumably most interesting finding from the point of view of empirical
contract theory refers to the relation between the contract length and the actual per-
formance. Again, we have two countervailing effects: on the one hand, the longer the
contract, the lower the performance (moral hazard effect). But on the other hand, we
show that the equilibrium contract length is increasing in a player’s potential (selection
effect). Comparing the three systems, we find that the relationship between performance
and contract length should be minimum under system B since there, the moral hazard
effect is most pronounced compared to the selection effect.
For the empirical analysis, we have compiled a comprehensive data set from the Ger-
man Bundesliga covering 1308 player years. The data contains all available information
on contract lengths, salaries, transfer fees and performance measures from 1994 to 2001.
As the Monti system has been put into force only very recently, the data allows for a
comparison between systems P and B only. All our theoretical results are empirically
confirmed, one exception being the impact of a player’s remaining contract length on
his salary in the new club after a transfer which, according to our model, should be
most pronounced under system B. However, we provide a plausible explanation based
on unobservable sign-up fees which tend to generate systematic countervailing effects.
Relation to the literature As indicated above, our paper is related to three lines of
research. With respect to the literature on sports economics, the impact of the Bosman
judgement has been analyzed by Simmons (1997) and Antonioni and Cubbin (2000) who
also argue that the average contract length should increase after the judgement. That
more flexible labor markets lead to a higher contract length is also empirically shown by
Kahn (1993) for Major League Baseball in the US. Szymanski (1999) argues that players
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benefit from the judgement, but takes the initial contract as being given.
To the best of our knowledge, all preceding empirical analyses on transfer fees includ-
ing Speight and Thomas (1997), and Carmichael, Forrest, and Simmons (1999) (for the
English Premier League), and Frick and Lehmann (2001) (for the German Bundesliga)
do neither have data on the contract length nor performance measures. Therefore, all
these papers were restricted to analyzing the impact of players’ characteristics such as
their position, age and experience on the transfer fees paid.
Our theoretical model partly builds on Feess and Muehlheusser (2003a) and Feess and
Muehlheusser (2003b) who also compare the different regimes using a contract theoretic
approach. In the second paper, the moral hazard issue is analyzed in more detail as
a player’s effort choice also affects his expected benefit from a transfer. Moreover, in
both papers, the renegotiation process is modeled explicitly, and one main focus is on
the comparison of the incentives to invest in the education of young talents under the
different legal regimes. In this paper, we have to neglect such investment issues because
the relevant data is unavailable.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one which analyzes the legal regimes
both theoretically and empirically. Thereby, a novel feature is that it explicitly deals with
the interplay of countervailing effects due to heterogeneity and moral hazard. It is well-
known among empirical contract theorists that the failure of adequately dealing with this
issue may lead to severely biased empirical results (see e.g. Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman,
and Pinquet (2003) and the survey by Chiappori and Salanie (2003)). Consequently,
several papers are dealing with the issue of separating these effects to yield unbiased
results (see e.g. Lazear (2000), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and Banerjee, Gertler,
and Ghatak (2002)). While our data does not allow for a full separation of these effects,
our empirical analysis nevertheless verifies that the relative importance of these effects
under the different legal regimes behaves as predicted by the model.
Our paper is also related to the literature about restrictions on the freedom of contract.
Diamond and Maskin (1979) analyze situations where two parties to a contract have a
joint incentive to use the contract as a commitment device to reduce the expected payoff
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of future trading partners. Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that a buyer and a seller
may stipulate a damage clause to prevent efficient trade with an outside party for some
states of the world. Whereas their result holds only if renegotiation is excluded, Spier and
Whinston (1995) extend the model to renegotiation and relation-specific investments, and
they show that the result can qualitatively be preserved in such a framework. In all these
situations, an appropriate restriction on the set of feasible contracts would be socially
desirable. On the other hand, Segal and Whinston (2000) stress the potential beneficial
effect of exclusive dealing clauses on investment incentives. We are not aware of any
empirical results on these issues. As explained above, the different transfer regimes which
we analyze also entail restrictions on the freedom of contract. Although we do not perform
a welfare comparison of these three regimes, our analyses shows both theoretically and
empirically how important economic variables such as the contract terms or performance
are affected by these restrictions.
We proceed as follows: After developing our theory in section 2, we present the data
and our empirical findings in section 3. Section 4 critically discusses our assumptions and
suggests some lines for further research.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
We consider a model where at date −1, a player and his initial club (”club i”) bargain
over a contract containing a contract length T and a wage W per unit of time. At date
0, the player starts playing in the league, and his career horizon is normalized to 1. We
suppose that the player’s performance e per unit of time in club i depends both on his
potential e0 and his contract length T , and we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 The player’s performance per unit of time in club i is the higher, the
higher his potential e0 and the lower the length of the initial contract T , i.e. e = e(e0, T )
satisfying ∂
∂e0
e(·) > 0, ∂
∂T
e(·) < 0 and ∂2
∂T 2
e(·) < 0.
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That e increases in the player’s potential is straightforward, and the moral hazard
problem behind the negative relationship between e and T has been explained in the
introduction (see, however, our remarks at the end of subsection 2.1). For simplicity,
we will continue with the explicit functional specification e(e0, T ) = e0 − 12T 2, where
e0 >
1
2
. Thus, the player’s actual performance e is lower than his potential e0 for all
T > 0.5 Finally, we assume that the monetary surplus generated by the player is simply
equal to e, so that the terms ”productivity” and ”performance” are used synonymously
throughout.
With probability g ∈ (0, 1), a shock occurs at some certain date t ∈ (0, 1) leading to
a performance emax = γe0 where γ > 1 per unit of time in another club, called the ”new
club” (club n). Thus, whenever the shock occurs, the player is more productive in club
n, independent of the terms of the initial contract. We assume common knowledge of e(·)
and emax at date −1, the only uncertainty being whether or not the shock occurs.
Since there is no asymmetric information in the model, we make the standard as-
sumption that negotiations are efficient such that they maximize the joint surplus of the
parties involved in the negotiations. This implies that i) at date −1, the initial contract
will maximize the joint surplus of the player and club i, and ii) in the renegotiation process
at date t, the player joins club n at date t regardless of the terms of the initial contract,
and regardless of the transfer system. The player then plays for club n with productivity
emax per unit of time until the end of his career at date 1. When the shock does not
occur, we simply assume that the player keeps playing for club i with productivity e(T )
until his career ends. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1:
5Note carefully that the assumption refers to the partial derivative, i.e. for a given potential e0; we
will show below in subsection 2.4 that, in equilibrium, high potential players will sign longer contracts so
that the oberserved relationship between contract length and absolute performance may well be positive.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events
To avoid confusion, there is one point concerning Assumption 1 which we would like
to discuss right away (and not only in the discussion in section 4). Our model will be
driven by the trade-off between the advantage of long contracts through higher payoffs
in the renegotiation game at date t and the disadvantage of long contracts captured by
the moral hazard problem ∂
∂T
e(·) < 0. The economic logic behind the moral hazard
problem is that a player knows that he will be paid in the future as long he has a valid
contract, even if he performs poorly. Hence, the moral hazard problem at each point in
time depends on the remaining contract length, and not on T itself. Accounting for this
would require a continuous model where e varies over time. And in our model where the
productivity shock leading to a change of clubs can only occur once at a certain date t,
it would then be optimal for club i and the player to agree upon an infinite number of
short-term contracts up to t − ε (where ε → 0), and to a long-term contract covering
the whole remaining time horizon at t− ε. To avoid these unrealistic features, it would
then be necessary to assume that the shock can occur at any point in time during the
player’s career. In fact, we considered a model where e is decreasing in the remaining
contract length, and where g = g(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ (0, 1). This continuous setting has two
advantages - it is more realistic and it is more convenient when turning from theory to
the empirical part. However, since the analysis then becomes extremely tedious without
changing any of our results, we finally decided to use this simpler discrete version. The
reason why all results remain unchanged is that the only aspect that matters is that the
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average performance decreases in the original contract length, and this is true in both
variants.
2.2 Renegotiation at Date t
Before we solve the model backwards starting with the renegotiation stage at date t, we
must first describe the three regimes more formally.
Definition 1 A transfer system rl = (rlV , rlN), l = P,B,M is characterized by two
legally administered transfer fees (veto sums) per unit of time which club i must accept if
the player wants to join club n at date t under contract situation c ∈ {V,N}.
The upper index V indicates that the player still has a valid contract, whereas N
means that the contract has expired. These fees are veto sums for the initial club, and
thus constitute upper bounds for the transfer fees actually paid. To distinguish between
the administered fees and the transfer fees actually paid, we refer to the first ones as
veto sums. Expressing all magnitudes per unit of time is helpful to separate the impact
of the transfer fee system from the impact of the remaining contract length. Note that
rBN = rMN = 0, since there are no veto sums (and hence no transfer fees actually paid)
for expired contracts after the Bosman judgement. Furthermore, rPV = rBV =∞, since
there is no fee under systems P and B which the initial club must accept if the player has
a valid contract. Finally, 0 < rPN , rMV < ∞, since club i can not prevent the transfer
upon receiving some finite amount when the player’s contract has expired under regime
P , and when the player has a valid contract under regime M . We summarize the legal
situation in the following table:
Valid contract (V ) No contract (N)
Pre-Bosman (P ) rPV =∞ 0 < rPN <∞
Bosman (B) rBV =∞ rBN = 0
Monti (M) 0 < rMV <∞ rMN = 0
Table 1: Veto sums for club i
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Note that rlV − rlN > 0 ∀l = P,B,M and that this difference is maximum under
regime B.
To determine the renegotiation payoff, assume that the player has signed a contract
with club i stipulating some contract length T , and that he wants to join club n at date
t. Define αj(e0, rlc) as party j’s renegotiation payoff per unit of time as a function of e0
where l = P,B,M captures the transfer fee system, c = V,N the contractual situation,
and where the index j = i, p, n stands for club i, the player and club n, respectively.
Instead of modeling this three-party renegotiation process explicitly, we take a reduced-
form approach and introduce the following assumptions on the renegotiation payoffs per
unit of time:
Assumption 2 For all rc ∈ [0,∞], renegotiation payoffs per unit of time have the fol-
lowing properties:
i) ∂αi(e0,r
c)
∂rc
≥ 0, ∂αp(e0,rc)
∂rc
≤ 0, and ∂αn(e0,rc)
∂rc
≤ 0.
ii) ∂αn(e0,r
c)
∂e0
> 0 and ∂
2αn(e0,rc)
∂e0∂rc
≤ 0 ∀ e0 > 12 .
Part i) of Assumption 2 expresses that club i’s renegotiation payoff per unit of time
(i.e. the actual transfer fee per unit of time) is weakly increasing in its veto sum rc,
whereas the player’s payoff (i.e. his new wage) and club n’s payoff (i.e. the remaining
surplus) are weakly decreasing in rc. The assumption can be justified for two reasons:
first, it is quite natural that club i benefits from more veto power. Second, we have shown
elsewhere that these properties can be endogenously derived from a bargaining game in
which the player negotiates simultaneously with both clubs in Nash-bargaining fashion.6
Note that we assume the partial derivatives with respect to rc to be only weak, since in
reality it does not seem to make any difference for the threat points in the renegotiations
6See Feess and Muehlheusser (2003b), where we build on an idea initially developed by Burguet,
Caminal, and Matutes (2002). Note that applying the Shapley value which is a frequently used concept
for cooperative games with more than two players is tedious here. The reason is that we would have
to specify the payoffs not only when club i either has full veto power (when r = ∞) or no veto power
at all (r = 0), but also for all r ∈ (0,∞). In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the Shapley value has
been used in contract theoretic models only when, using our terminology, either r = 0 or r = ∞ were
considered. Examples include Segal and Whinston (2000) who use a slightly more general concept when
analyzing exclusive dealing clauses or Hart and Moore (1990) for the case of asset ownership.
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whether the veto sum for a mediocre player is 200 or 300 million Euro.
Part ii) of the assumption expresses that club n benefits from an increase in e0 which
determines the size of the renegotiation surplus, but this increase becomes smaller when
the veto sum of club i, rc, rises (i.e. when the transfer system becomes stricter). To see
that this also seems natural, note that a sufficient condition for this assumption to hold
is that club n gets a fixed percentage of the renegotiation surplus for a given rc whereas
this percentage is decreasing in rc due to part i) of the assumption. For example, suppose
club n gets 1
4
of the surplus for r = rV and 1
2
for r = rN < rV . When the renegotiation
surplus increases from 100 to 200, say, his payoff increases by 25 (from 25 to 50) if r = rV
and by 50 (from 50 to 100) if r = rN < rV .
Finally, each regime l = P,B,M is completely specified by two numbers rlV and rlN .
Thus, when no confusion is possible, instead of writing αj(e0, rlc) we save on notation
and from now on simply write αlcj (e0). Recalling that all α
lc
j (e0) are expressed per unit of
time, the overall payoffs from renegotiation are obtained by summing over time. In doing
so, we can restrict attention to T ∈ [t, 1], since it does not make any difference whether
the contract length is T = t or some T < t. In both cases, the player is out-of-contract
when the shock occurs, so that only rlN would matter for the renegotiation game. The
idea behind the renegotiation process is again illustrated in figure 2:
 
T 
 
Contract 
Ends 
1 
 
Career 
Ends 
Date t 
 
Renegotiation
Date 
Remaining 
Contract Time
αj
V αj
N
Contract Expired
Figure 2: Illustration of the Renegotiation Process
Moreover, for our empirical purposes it will be useful to express total renegotiation
payoffs not as a function of the contract length T but, equivalently, as a function of
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the remaining contract length R := T − t. Denoting by πj(e0, R, rl) party j’s total
renegotiation payoff as a function of the player’s potential e0, the player’s remaining
contract length R and the veto sums under system l, we get:
πi(e0, R, r
l) = R · αlVi (e0) + (1−R− t) · αlNi (e0) (1)
πp(e0, R, r
l) = R · αlVp (e0) + (1−R− t) · αlNp (e0) (2)
πn(e0, R, r
l) = R · αlVn (e0) + (1−R− t) · αlNn (e0). (3)
In each line, the first term gives the payoff for the period for which the player has a
valid contract, while the second term is the payoff for the period for which the contract
has expired. Thus, πi(·) is the total transfer fee actually paid, πp(·) is the total wage of
the player in club n, and πn(·) is club n’s share of the total surplus (1−t)γe0 to be shared
in the renegotiation process. This leads to the following results:
Proposition 1 i) Under each regime, the total renegotiation payoff is increasing in R
for club i and decreasing for the player and club n, i.e. d
dR
πi(·) > 0, ddRπp(·) < 0, and
d
dR
πn(·) < 0, ∀l = P,B,M .
ii) Under regime P , club i (weakly) benefits from an increase in rPN while the player and
club n are (weakly) worse off, i.e. dπi(e0,R,r
PN )
drPN
≥ 0, dπp(e0,R,rPN )
drPN
≤ 0, dπn(e0,R,rPN )
drPN
≤ 0.
iii) Under regimeM , club i (weakly) benefits from an increase in rMV while the player and
club n are (weakly) worse off, i.e. dπi(e0,R,r
MV )
drMV
≥ 0, dπp(e0,R,rMV )
drMV
≤ 0, dπn(e0,R,rMV )
drMV
≤ 0.
iv) The marginal effect of an increase in R is largest under regime B, i.e.
¯̄
d
dR
πj(·, rB)
¯̄
>¯̄
d
dR
πj(·, rP )
¯̄
,
¯̄
d
dR
πj(·, rM)
¯̄ ∀j = p, i, n.
Proof. Follows immediately from Assumption 2 and Table 1. ¥
The proposition is just a simple transformation of Assumption 2 and the entries in
Table 1; but it is very useful for our purposes of testing the proposition in the empirical
part of the paper. The reason for part i) is that due to rlV − rlN > 0 ∀l, club i gets the
higher payoff for a longer period of time, while the reverse is true for the player and for
club n. Parts ii) and iii) follow directly from Assumption 2 part i). Finally, as for part
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iv), the impact of the contract length is highest under regime B, because the difference
of veto sums is highest, too.
For our empirical purposes, let us emphasize another aspect of Proposition 1: Al-
though our statements refer to a player’s total wage πp in club n, they also hold for
πp
1−t ,
i.e. for a player’s average wage in the new club per unit of time as (1− t) is a constant.
In the empirical tests, we will use the annual wage of a player in the new club.
2.3 The Initial Contract
We can now turn to the analysis of the initial contract. Under each regime l, this contract
will maximize the expected joint surplus of the player and club i given by
JS(e0, T, r
l) = te(e0, T ) + g
£
(T − t) (emax − αlVn (e0)) + (1− T )
¡
emax − αlNn (e0)
¢¤
+ (1− g) (1− t) e(e0, T ). (4)
Regardless of the shock, club i and the player get the surplus e(·) up to date t. If the
shock occurs (which happens with probability g), they get the new total surplus emax
minus club n’s renegotiation payoff. This payoff is αlVn (e0) for period (T − t) for which
the player’s contract is still valid, and αlNn (e0) for period (1− T ) when the contract has
expired. With probability (1 − g), there is no shock, and club i and the player share
surplus (1− t)e(·). Substituting e(·) = e0 − 12T 2, and rearranging yields
JS(e0, T, r
l) = (1− g (1− t))
µ
e0 − 1
2
T 2
¶
+ g
£
(T − t) ¡emax − αlVn (e0)¢+ (1− T ) ¡emax − αlNn (e0)¢¤ . (5)
The optimal contract length under regime l is denoted T l and solves argmaxT JS(e0, T, rl).
Since d
2
dT 2
JS(·) = − (1− g (1− t)) < 0, the problem is strictly concave in T , so that T l
satisfies the first order condition and is thus given by:
T l =
g
£
αlNn (e0)− αlVn (e0)
¤
(1− g (1− t)) . (6)
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This leads to
Proposition 2 i) The optimal contract length is highest under regime B, i.e. TB >
TP , TM .
ii) Under each regime, the higher a player’s potential e0, the higher the length of the
initial contract, i.e. dT
l
de0
> 0 ∀l = P,B,M .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for part (i) can be seen from Eqn. (6): When deciding on the optimal
contract length, club i and the player trade-off two inefficiencies: the longer the contract,
the lower the player’s performance as d
dT
e(·) < 0. But the shorter the contract, the higher
is club n’s renegotiation payoff. The first effect is independent of the transfer system,
whereas the second effect depends on the difference between club n’s payoff per unit of
time with and without a valid contract. The higher this difference, the higher club i’s
and the player’s incentive to increase T . And this difference is maximum under system
B, because rBV = ∞ and rBN = 0 (see Table 1 above). Ordering TP and TM is not
possible without specifying respective values of rPN and rMN as rPV > rMV , but also
rPN > rMN so that the difference is indeterminate. Note that, without any negative
effect associated with long term contracts (modeled here as a moral hazard problem via
Assumption 1), we would get a corner solution T l ≡ 1∀l as there would only remain the
incentive to reduce the renegotiation payoff of club n.7 Part (ii) follows from assuming
that the impact of T on club n’s renegotiation payoff increases in e0 since the amount to
be divided is emax = γe0. While it can easily be shown that T l is also increasing in g, so
that players with a higher shock probability would also sign a longer contract, we focus
here on the impact of a player’s potential e0 to explain why we observe different contract
lengths in reality.8
It remains to determine how the surplus is split between club i and the player via the
wage W . As for this, we simply assume that the player gets some share β of the surplus,
7To see this, simply set e(·) = e0. Then JS(·) in Eqn. (5) is strictly increasing in T .
8See also the discussion in section 4.
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where 0 < β < 1. β may vary from player to player, depending for instance on the initial
competition of clubs for players, on the position or on the relative bargaining skills of the
parties. All we need is that β is neither zero nor one, and this seems to be quite plausible.
Denote by Πp(e0, T l, rl) the player’s overall payoff when the jointly optimal contract
length T l is chosen, i.e.
Πp(e0, T
l, rl) = (1− g(1− t)) ·W + g · [(T l − t) · αlVp + (1− T l) · αlNp ]. (7)
Whenever the player is playing for club i (which happens with probability one until date t
and with probability (1−g) for period (1−t)), he gets wageW per unit of time. If the shock
occurs, he gets renegotiation payoff πp(e0, T l, rl) = (T l−t)·αlVp (e0)+(1−T l)·αlNp (e0). Since
the player gets a fraction β of the joint surplus, we have Πp(e0, T l, rl) = β · JS(e0, T l, rl),
and the initial wage W l =W (e0, T l, rl) per unit of time is thus implicitly given by
(1− g(1− t))W l + g · [(T l − t)αlVp (e0) + (1− T l)αlNp (e0)] = β · JS(e0, T l, rl). (8)
This leads to
Proposition 3 i) Under each regime, a higher optimal contract length leads to a higher
initial wage, i.e. d
dT
W l(·)¯̄
T=T l
> 0 ∀l = P,B,M .
ii) At the margin, this effect is largest under regime B, i.e. d
dT
WB(·)¯̄
T=TB
> d
dT
WP (·)¯̄
T=TP
, d
dT
WM(·)¯̄
T=TM
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As for part i), recall from Proposition 2 part ii) that the privately optimal contract
length increases in e0. And for any ê0 > e0 (which implies T l(ê0) > T l(e0) for the optimal
contract length T (·)) we must have JS(ê0, T l(ê0)) > JS(e0, T l(e0)) since the player and
club i could otherwise simply choose the same contract length for ê0 as for e0 which would
still lead to JS(ê0, T l(e0)) > JS(e0, T l(e0)). And since the player’s wage is increasing in
JS, part i) follows. For an intuition of part ii), recall that the negative impact of T on
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club n’s renegotiation payoff is highest under system B, so that the impact of T on JS
(and hence on W ) must be highest, too.9
2.4 Comparison of actual player performance
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of the legal systems on the relationship
between the equilibrium contract length T l and the actual performance e. As for this,
denote for all l = P,B,M by el = e(e0, T l) the actual performance of a player with
potential e0 when the optimal contract length T l is chosen.
To determine the sign of de
l
dT l
, we have to take into account the following countervailing
effects: On the one hand do we know from part ii) of Proposition 2 that players with
higher potential sign longer initial contracts. Since high potential players perform better
than low potentials if the contract length is identical, this suggests a positive relationship
between el and T l. We call this the ”selection effect”. But on the other hand, it is
clear from Assumption 1 that the moral hazard problem ceteris paribus increases with
the contract length, and this suggests a negative relationship between el and T l. As
mentioned in the Introduction, this interplay between moral hazard and heterogeneity
is a well-known problem in empirical contract theory, and it implies - in our model -
that the sign of the overall effect can be either positive or negative.10 However, we get
a precise prediction concerning the relative importance of these two effects under the
different regimes:
Proposition 4 For the relationship between the actual performance el and the equilib-
rium contract length T l under the different regimes, we have de
B
dTB
< de
P
dTP
, de
M
dTM
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
9Note, however, that Proposition 3 holds only if the optimal contract length T l is chosen. For any
other contract length, the moral hazard effect could outweigh the renegotiation effect, thereby reducing
JS and thus W for any β given.
10Note that we cannot exclude de
l
dT l
< 0 by arguing that it can never be optimal for club i and the player
to sign a contract such that the selection effect is dominated. If the impact on club n’s renegotiation
payoff is strong enough, this can be consistent with joint surplus maximization.
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Intuitively, the reason for de
B
dTB
< de
P
dTP
is as follows: Recall from Proposition 2 part
i) that the incentive to increase the initial contract length is highest under regime B.
Thus, the corresponding level of e0 for each T is lower than under regime P . In other
words, since a long contract is chosen even for mediocre players, the moral hazard effect
is relatively more important under system B compared to system P . An analogous
argument holds for the result de
B
dTB
< de
M
dTM
. As in Proposition 2 part i), the comparison
between regimes P and M is ambiguous and depends on the difference between the
renegotiation payoffs when the player’s contract is valid or expired and thus on the sign
of (rPN −rPV )− (rMN −rMV ). Summing up, we find that the legal restrictions expressed
in the systems P , B and M not only influence the terms of the contract and the payoffs,
but also the relationship between the equilibrium contract length and the performance.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Description of the Data
In this section we aim at providing empirical support for the predictions of our model.
Since system M has been enacted just recently, we have to restrict attention to systems
B and P . Our data cover six consecutive seasons in the German top professional soccer
league (”Bundesliga”) of which the first two (1994/95 and 1995/96) have been played
under system P and the remaining four (1996/97-1999/2000) under system B. Using
the two leading German soccer magazines “Kicker” and "Sport-Bild", we have compiled
a data set with detailed information on player performance, contract duration, annual
remuneration and transfer fees paid. Player performance per season is measured by a
composite index, called "kick index", that takes into consideration both position-specific
factors such as the number of assists per match for a striker, and team specific factors as
the result of a match.11
Our data set includes information on 1308 different contracts. In 695 cases, these
11More information about the composition of this performance index is provided in Appendix D.
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contracts were signed following a transfer, while in the remaining 613 cases, players re-
signed with their current club. Altogether, we know the annual salaries agreed upon
in 937 cases, and the duration of the contract in 975 cases. When a player has been
transferred from another club, we have information about the remaining contract length
at the time of the transfer in this old club for 239 cases. Moreover, we have the actual
transfer fees for 684 cases (in 142 of them, the transfer fee was zero). Overall, our sample
includes 53% of all transfers in which a non-zero transfer fee was paid during the time
period under consideration. These are all cases where the transfer fee has been reported
in the media, and we see no reason for a sample selection bias. Nevertheless, we will
account for this possibility by also using a Heckman Two Step Procedure in the empirical
analysis.
Finally, since the composite index is only calculated for ”regular” players who ap-
peared in a match for at least 30 out of the 90 minutes a soccer match lasts, we have
information on performance for 1318 player years. Table 2 gives more information on
the dependent variables and shows how many cases refer to the Pre-Bosman- and the
Bosman-period, respectively. As will become clear below, our estimations will involve
the simultaneous use of these variables. This tends to reduce the available number of
observations as we do not have all relevant information for all cases. For example, we
have information on the contract length and the salary for 604 cases, and on the contract
length and the performance in 739 cases.
insert table 2 here
During the time period of our sample, the soccer industry in Europe has seen a huge
increase in TV revenues (during the 6-year period under consideration the increase was
100% ), a fact which we have to take into account. In our estimations, we will therefore
not use the nominal values of the variables which are measured in monetary units (i.e.
transfer fees and wages), but instead use the standardized values ln( transfer feeaverage transfer fee ) and
ln( annual salaryaverage annual salary ).
12
12Kernel density estimates for these standardized variables and for player performance as well as the
distribution of contract durations are provided in Appendix E.
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As control variables we use measures that have been identified in a number of studies
as (potential) determinants of player salaries and transfer fees in European soccer (see
the literature review in the Introduction). As can be seen in table 3, these variables
include both individual characteristics of the players like age and nationality and team
characteristics such as the average number of tickets sold per game.
insert table 3 here
3.2 Testing the Theoretical Predictions
3.2.1 Testing Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is concerned with the impact of the remaining contract length in a player’s
old club at the time of the transfer on the renegotiation payoffs under the different
regimes. Since there is no real-world data for system M yet, part (iii) of Proposition 1
cannot (yet) be tested. Moreover, we do not have player specific data for the administered
transfer fee rPN , i.e. about club i’s veto sum if a contract has expired under the Pre-
Bosman system. This also renders the test of part ii) impossible, which leaves us with
testing the remaining parts of the Proposition:
Hypothesis 1 a) Under regimes P and B, a higher remaining length of the player’s old
contract increases the transfer fee paid by the new club and decreases the player’s annual
salary in the new club.
b) At the margin, these effects are stronger under regime B than under regime P .
Naturally, the hypothesis concerns only situations in which a transfer has been carried
out which leaves us with a sample size of N = 239. We estimate an OLS model with
heteroskedasticity consistent t-values (see White (1980)) because the LM-Test suggests
that unobserved player characteristics do not affect our results. In fact, there are only
seven players in our sample who have been transferred more than once. The estimation
results concerning the transfer fees are reported in table 4 (column (1)).
insert table 4 here
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The table shows that our theoretical results concerning the impact of the remaining
contract length on the transfer fees actually paid are empirically confirmed. One more
remaining year of contract in the old club increases the transfer fee by 3.2%, and this
effect is significant at the 1%-level. Moreover, we also find that this effect has become
stronger under the Bosman regime B, i.e. we get another increase by 0.9% and thus 28%
more compared to regime P . Also, our control variables confirm the findings by, among
others, Carmichael, Forrest, and Simmons (1999) and Frick and Lehmann (2001), for
instance, that age and career games played have a statistically significant and non-linear
impact on the transfer fees.
As already mentioned, our data set contains only about half of all transfers carried
out during the time period under consideration, a fact which could at least theoretically
bias our sample. For this reason we have also tested a Heckman Two-Step model by
estimating the probability of a transfer first, and then the transfer fee given that a transfer
has taken place. As instrumental variable we use the player’s tenure in his old club as
this presumably influences the likelihood of a transfer, but not the transfer fee itself. The
results of this estimation are reported in column (2) of table 4 and are virtually identical
to the OLS estimates which suggests that there is no sample bias.
The respective results for annual wages are shown in table 5:
insert table 5 here
First, recall that part (i) of Proposition 1 is expressed with respect to the player’s
total wage πp, whereas part (i) of Hypothesis 1 refers to the annual wage (which can be
interpreted as the wage per unit of time, i.e. as πp
1−t in the theoretical model). As explained
in subsection 2.2, this is clearly the adequate measure for testing the Proposition. The
estimation confirms our theoretical result that a higher remaining contract length has a
negative effect on the player’s annual wage in his new club: one more remaining year of
contract reduces his annual wage by 2%. Again, this effect is highly significant. Finally,
a Heckman Two-Step estimation yields basically identical results.
However, it cannot be empirically confirmed that the impact on wages is higher under
system B. By contrast, we find at a low significance level that the negative impact of the
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remaining contract length on the wage in the new club has become weaker under regime
B. In our view, this might be attributed to hidden sign-up fees which clubs pay ”under
the table” to players whose contracts with their old clubs have expired. There is abound
anecdotal evidence that this practice has become quite common only in the aftermath
of the Bosman judgement. Of course, these payments should be interpreted as part of
a player’s salary. Unfortunately, they are notoriously hard to observe and consequently,
we have no information in which cases such fees have been paid in our sample.13 If
such fees are paid in addition to the regular wage to out-of-contract players, and if this
phenomenon is more pronounced under regime B, then our regression under-estimates
the benefit from being out-of-contract under system B, and thus also the wage reduction
from having a positive remaining contract length.
3.2.2 Testing Proposition 2
Whereas Proposition 1 referred to the renegotiation game, Proposition 2 analyzes the
impact of the transfer fee system and a player’s potential e0 on the contract length. Since
we have no empirical proxy for e0 (our index measures only the actual performance e),
we have to restrict our attention to part (i) of Proposition 2:
Hypothesis 2 The average contract length is higher under system B than under system
P , i.e. TB > TP .
When testing the hypothesis, the LM-test statistic suggests that an OLS estimation
is inferior to a Random Effects-model. The results of the RE-estimation are reported in
table 6:
insert table 6 here
The average contract length has indeed been increasing from 2.43 years to 2.91 years
after the Bosman ruling, and controlling for a number of different dimensions of a player’s
13One example is the transfer of German ”prodigal” Sebastain Deisler from Hertha BSC Berlin to
Bayern Munich in 2002. The fact that Munich had paid a sign-up fee of 10 Mio. € became publicly
known only after an obvious leakage in the administration of one of the clubs. This resulted in a copy of
the cheque being printed on the title page of Germany’s largest tabloid ”Bild”.
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performance, we find that this is statistically significant at a high level. This lends broad
support to our hypothesis that this difference has to be attributed mainly to the changes
in the underlying incentive structure. Furthermore, most of the statistical controls have
the expected sign and are statistically different from zero. For example, older players
sign shorter contracts while more “established” players (those with a high number of
career games and those who have played for their respective national team) get longer
contracts.14
3.2.3 Testing Proposition 3
Let us first recall that, in Proposition 1, we were interested in the impact of a player’s
remaining contract length in his old club on the new contract terms (i.e. the transfer fee
and the wage paid by the new club). In other words, we considered the impact of the old
contract on the renegotiation game for a new contract. Now, we are testing the impact
of the contract length in a club on the wage in this club itself. Since it is precisely the
anticipated gain in the renegotiation game that sets incentives for long-term contracts,
Proposition 1 was the basis for Proposition 3. Of course, the adequate measure for testing
the Hypothesis is again not the total wage but the annual wage (see the remarks after
Proposition 1).15 We test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 a) Under both systems P and B, the annual wage in the current club is
increasing in the contract length in the current club.
b) This effect is larger under system B.
The fact that we are now concerned with the impact of the contract length on the
wage in the current club implies that, compared to the test of Proposition 1, the sample
size increases from N = 239 to N = 604. This is due to the fact that we can now also
use those cases in which a player and his club renewed their contract without a transfer
14Similar findings have been reported by Kahn (1993) using data from US Major League Baseball.
15In our theoretical model, this makes no difference as the expected time the player plays for club i is
independent of the contract length.
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taking place (of course, this new contract will typically stipulate a different length and/or
wage than the previous one). This also increases the degree of unobserved heterogeneity,
because we now have up to four different contracts per individual player. Therefore, in
addition to the OLS model used for testing Hypothesis 1, we also estimate a Random
Effects model, the results of both being shown in table 7:
insert table 7 here
Our RE estimates strongly confirms the hypothesis: When the contract length in-
creases by one year, the annual wage goes up by 0.7%. This effect is significant at the
1%-level. Moreover, the interaction term (Contract Duration times Bosman Dummy) is
positive and significant, implying an additional increase of about 0.5% per year under
regime B. In turn, this implies an increase by more than 50% compared to regime P .
Again, the signs of the standard control variables are as expected, and as predicted in
previous studies (see e.g. Lucifora and Simmons (2003)): For example, the number of
career games has a positive but decreasing influence on wages, and being selected for the
national team also increases a player’s income.
3.2.4 Testing Proposition 4
We now move to testing the relationship between the contract duration and the actual
performance. Let us first mention that, conversely to Proposition 4, Hypothesis 4 is stated
with respect to the remaining contract length instead of the absolute (initial) contract
length. As explained at the end of subsection 2.1, this difference comes from the fact that
in our model, we have expressed the moral hazard problem with respect to the absolute
contract length for simplicity. For empirical purposes, however, it seems adequate to
choose the remaining contract length instead. As explained above, the underlying eco-
nomic logic is the same since in both cases, the average performance is decreasing in the
contract length.
As pointed out in section 2.4, this relationship between the remaining contract length
and performance is indeterminate from a theoretical point of view: on the one hand do
players with a higher potential sign longer contracts, while on the other hand, a longer
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remaining contract length leads to lower performance incentives ("moral hazard effect"),
thereby driving the overall result ambiguous.
However, our theory unambiguously predicts how the net impact of the two effects
changes as one moves from regime P to regime B: While the moral hazard problem is
basically the same under both regimes, the incentive for the initial club i and the player
to sign a long-term contract is higher under system B, which reinforces the impact of the
moral hazard problem in equilibrium. We thus test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 A larger remaining contract length has a stronger negative impact on
observed performance under system P than under system B.
To identify the determinants of a player’s performance, we again estimate a RE-model,
because we have up to six observations per player. The estimation results are shown in
table 8:
insert table 8 here
The table shows that the hypothesis is supported by the data: First, a remaining
contract length of one more year increases average performance by 2.15 index points,
thereby suggesting that the selection effect dominates in our sample. Second and more
importantly, this effect becomes weaker under the Bosman regime (−1.21 index points).
We take this result as supportive of the basic idea of our model that the legal change
affects the trade-off between the selection- and the moral hazard-effect, thereby not only
leading to a different equilibrium contract length, but also to a different relationship
between contract length and performance.
4 Discussion
We have developed a model for analyzing the impact of the three different transfer systems
in European soccer. Our main theoretical and empirical results can be summarized as
follows: (i) under all regimes, the initial club benefits at the renegotiation stage from
high veto sums and from long contracts. (ii) since the impact of the contract length on
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the renegotiation payoffs is maximum under the Bosman regime B, the contract length
is highest under this regime, too. (iii) when a player signs a longer contract, then he
is compensated for his lower renegotiation payoff by receiving a higher initial wage per
unit of time. This effect is again maximum under regime B. (iv) finally, the relationship
between the contract length and the observed performance can theoretically be either
positive (when the selection effect dominates) or negative (when the moral hazard effect
dominates), but in any case, it is higher under regime P than under system B.
Although all but one of our theoretical propositions are confirmed empirically at a
highly significant level, one may nevertheless challenge some of our underlying assump-
tions. First, recall that an interior solution for the contract length arises due to the
trade-off between the new club’s renegotiation payoff (which decreases in T , respectively
R) and the moral hazard problem (which increases in T , respectively R). Thereby, we
assume that the moral hazard problem is independent of the transfer fee system, whereas
the renegotiation impact of the contract length depends on the system. Alternatively,
one might assume that the moral hazard problem also depends on the transfer fee sys-
tem, for instance because a player’s incentive may be higher if he expects a high payoff in
renegotiations.16 However, we believe it to be reasonable that at least part of the problem
arises simply due to the fact that the player is ”insured” by the long-term contract.
Furthermore, different contract durations within one regime (B, say) in our model
arise due to different potentials (e0). Let us emphasize that we are far from denying that
there are many other aspects influencing the optimal contract length: risk preferences
may be different,17 the shock probability g may vary from player to player, and in a
dynamic model where the shock can arise at any point of time, the probability densities
may differ across players. Moreover, the moral hazard exposure may also vary across
players which could be captured in our model by assuming that ek = e0 − bkT 2, thereby
expressing the player-specific moral hazard exposure via bk. However, it is well known in
16This is exactly the assumption underlying the results in Feess and Muehlheusser (2003b).
17Note, however, that introducing risk-aversion would not change our results qualitatively. Under
the realistic assumption that players are more risk averse than clubs, this would simply give another
argument in favor of signing long term contracts.
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empirical sports economics that high-potential players sign longer contracts (see i.e. Kahn
(1993)). In addition, explaining different contract durations via differences in e0 leads to
interesting insights on the impact of transfer regimes which are perfectly compatible with
our empirical findings. Finally, with respect to the issue of identification, our result that
the relationship between the remaining contract length and observed performance should
be more pronounced under regime P seems rather specific and can hardly be explained
with other approaches. We therefore tend to take the empirical confirmation of this result
as being supportive of our theory.
Although the impact of legal restrictions on contract terms has so far hardly been
tested empirically so that our approach seems to be important, there exists a clear draw-
back of our analysis: the theoretical literature aims at analyzing potential restrictions on
the freedom of contract from a normative perspective, and this is clearly missing in our
paper - we have no propositions like ”system B is socially superior to system P”. From
a theoretical point of view, our model allows for such a prediction: since actual perfor-
mance is decreasing in the contract length, and since the contract length is maximum
under regime B, the quality of the league should be lower after the Bosman judgement
as the moral hazard problem becomes more severe. However, we have not tested such
a hypothesis because we believe that our performance measure only allows for relative,
but not for absolute performance comparisons - it seems to us that the grades assigned
to players in the soccer magazines do not relate to the absolute quality of the league.
In other words, it is not possible that both, the defender and the striker loose the same
tackle at the same time. Furthermore, social welfare also depends on competitive balance
and on the incentives to invest in the training of young talents, which both are aspects
that are not incorporated in our theoretical model.
Although these issues are clearly important and deserve further research, we are also
interested in extending our framework in the following two directions: First, the fact that
only about 10 percent of a player’s salary is related to performance indicates that setting
incentives is not costless. And since the moral hazard problem is most severe under regime
B due to higher contract durations, our model would also predict that the performance-
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related payments should be higher after the Bosman judgement, too. Second, Proposition
4 sheds light on the interplay between the selection effect and the moral hazard-effect,
but it does not allow to fully separate these two effects. This requires to gather more
detailed data at the individual player level, and we are currently working on such a
project. Preliminary results show that, controlling for age, position and other factors, the
ratio between actual performance and maximum performance is indeed decreasing in the
remaining contract length, thereby supporting the moral hazard assumption underlying
our theory.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
Part i) Define hl(e0) := αlNn (e0)− αlVn (e0). From Assumption 2 part i), since rlV −
rLN is maximum under regime B (rBV = ∞ and rBN = 0), it follows that hB(e0) >
hP (e0), hM(e0).
Part ii) We have dT
l
deo
= g
1−g(1−t)h
0
l(e0) and it follows from Assumption 2 part ii) that
h0l(e0) > 0 since r
lV > rLN for all l = P,B,M .
B Proof of Proposition 3
Part i) From Eqn. (8), and from emax − αlcn (e0) = αlci (e0) + αlcp (e0) for l = P,B,M
and c = V,N , it follows that W l is implicitly given by the following equation:
(1− g(1− t)) ·W l + g · [(T l − t)αlVp (e0) + (1− T l)αlNp (e0)]
= β ·
·
(1− g (1− t))
µ
e0 − b
2
T 2
¶
+ g
£
(T − t) ¡αlVi (e0) + αlVp (e0)¢+ (1− T ) ¡αlNi (e0) + αlNp (e0)¢¤¸
which is equivalent to
0 = (1− g(1− t)) · (W l − β(e0 − b
2
T 2)
− g £(T − t) (β(αlVi (e0) + αlVp (e0))− αlVp (e0)) + (1− T ) (β ¡αlNi (e0) + αlNp (e0)¢− αlNp (e0))¤
Applying the implicit function theorem, we get
dW l
dT
= −(1− g(1− t)) · βbT − g ·
£
β(αlNn (e0)− αlVn (e0)) + αlNp (e0)− αlVp (e0)
¤
(1− g(1− t))
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Evaluating this derivative at the optimal contract length, T l =
g[αlNn (e0)−αlVn (e0)]
(1−g(1−t)) (see Eqn
(6)), this simplifies to
dW l
dT
¯̄̄̄
T=T l
=
g
£
αlNp (e0)− αlVp (e0)
¤
(1− g(1− t)) > 0 ∀l = P,B,M (9)
Part ii) It follows directly from observing in Eqn. (9) that dW
l
dT l
is the larger, the
larger
¡
αlNp (e0)− αlVp (e0)
¢
. From Assumption 2 part i), this term is maximum under
regime B, since rBN = 0 and rBV =∞.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Recall from Eqn. (6) that the optimal contract length under regime l is given by
T l(e0) =
g
£
αlNn (e0)− αlVn (e0)
¤
(1− g (1− t)) (10)
Now define hl(e0) := αlNn (e0) − αlVn (e0). Note that Assumption 2 part ii) together with
the entries in table 1 implies that the following relation holds:
α0MNn (e0) = α
0BN
n (e0) > α
0PN
n (e0), α
0MV
n (e0) > α
0BV
n (e0) = α
0PV
n (e0). (11)
This in turn implies that hl(·) is strictly increasing in e0 for all l = P,B,M since h0l(·) =
α0lNn (e0)−α0lVn (e0) > 0 for all l. Let us assume for simplicity that hl(·) is also continuous
and differentiable such that the inverse function h−1l (·) is well-defined. We can now re-
write Eqn. (10) in terms of hl(·) and solve for e0 to yield e0 = h−1l (1−g(1−t)g T l) so that the
function
E0(T ) ≡ h−1l (
1− g (1− t)
g
T ) (12)
gives that level of potential which corresponds to (equilibrium) contract length T . In the
next step, denote el as the actual performance of the player when (equilibrium) contract
length T is chosen, i.e. el = e(E0(T ), T ). Using Eqn. (12) allows us to establish the
33
relationship between T and the actual performance el:
el(T ) = h−1l (
1− g (1− t)
g
T )− 1
2
(T )2
such that d
dT
el = h−10l (·)(1−g(1−t)g ) − T where h−10l (·) > 0 for all l = P,B,M . For the
comparison of the different regimes, we can again use Assumption 2 part ii) to establish
that h0B(e0) > h
0
P (e0), h
0
M(e0). Using the Eqn. (11), we have
h0B(e0) > h
0
P (e0)⇔
α0BNn (e0)− α0BVn (e0) > α0PNn (e0)− α0PVn (e0)⇔
α0BNn (e0)− α0PVn (e0) > α0PNn (e0)− α0PVn (e0)⇔
α0BNn (e0) > α
0PN
n (e0)
which is true since rBN = 0 < rPN . Analogously, for the comparison of h0B(e0) and
h0M(e0) we have
h0B(e0) > h
0
M(e0)⇔
α0BNn (e0)− α0BVn (e0) > α0MNn (e0)− α0MVn (e0)⇔
α0BNn (e0)− α0BVn (e0) > α0BNn (e0)− α0MVn (e0)⇔
α0BVn (e0) < α
0MV
n (e0)
which also holds since rBV = ∞ > rMV . Since the ranking for the derivatives of the
inverse functions h−10l (·) = 1h0l(·) is then just reversed, the statement in the proposition
follows.
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D Composition of the Performance Index
Performance Independent of Performance Dependent on
Player Position Player Position
Goalkeeper
Team Win 5 Goal Against Team -20
Team Loss -5 No Goal Allowed 10
Goal Scored 20 Ordinary Save 10
Goal Scored for Opponent -10 Difficult Save 20
Penalty Kick Successful 10 Defender
Penalty Kick Missed -10 Tackle Won 5
Goal Assist 15 Tackle Lost -5
Responsible for Goal Against Team -20 Long Pass 1
Responsible for Penalty Kick -10 Shot on Goal Prepared 2
Goal Missed -5 No Goal Allowed 10
Shot on Goal (-16m) 4 1-2 Goals Against -5
Shot on Goal (16m+) 1 3-4 Goals Against -10
Yellow Card -3 5-6 Goals Against -20
Yellow/Red Card -15 7+ Goals Against -30
Red Card -20 Midfielder
Tackle Won 3
Tackle Lost -2
Long Pass 1
Shot on Goal Prepared 5
Forward
Tackle Won 1
Shot on Goal Prepared 2
Number 
of Points
Number 
of Points
Source: Ziebs (2002, p. 100)
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E Illustration of Sample Properties
Distribution of Contract Duration
 
 fraction 
contract duration, T 1 
5+ 
0 
 .375 
Kernel Density Estimates
 
  Density 
 
Log of normalized transfer fee 
 Density 
.67028 1.2035
.00332
4.9984
a) Transfer Fees
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 Density 
 
  log of normalized salaries 
 
.82458 1.1873
.04092
6.581
b) Salaries
 
density 
 
player performance, e 
33.6495 94.1505 
.000026 
.042746 
c) Player Performance
37
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (1 DM ≈ 0.5 €) 
 
 
N of Cases Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Total P B 
Player Performance 
(composite kick-index) 
69.6 9.3 35.6 92.2 1318 450 868 
Contract Duration 
(in years) 
2.83 1.0 1 7 975 224 751 
Annual Salary 
(in DM) 
1,050320 1,015379 80000 6,500000 937 111 826 
Actually Paid Transfer 
Fee (in DM) 
1,354000 2,372435 0 17,000000 684 187 497 
 
 
 
Table 3: Independent Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Post-Bosman Era# 0.68 0.46 
Season Dummies For Each Season#   
Player Characteristics 
Remaining Contract Years 2.53 1.07 
Age 26.0 4.2 
Number of Career Games Played 72.5 93.0 
Appearance in National Team# 0.33 0.47 
Semi-Professional# 0.11 0.31 
Home-Grown Talent# 0.23 0.42 
Nationality Dummies#   
   German 0.70 0.46 
   Western Europe 0.10 0.30 
   Eastern Europe (reference category) 0.12 0.33 
   Other Countries 0.08 0.27 
Position Dummies#   
   Goalkeeper (reference category) 0.10 0.30 
   Defender 0.27 0.44 
   Midfielder 0.41 0.49 
   Forward 0.22 0.41 
Team Change Between Seasons# 0.29 0.45 
Team Characteristics 
Team Qualified for European Cup# 0.36 0.48 
Average Number of Tickets Sold 27337 12527 
Stadium Capacity Utilization (in %) 0.66 0.21 
Final League Position 9.65 5.17 
 
# Dummy variable (0=no; 1=yes) 
 
N=1,308 (cases for which we have information on either the annual  
salary, the length of the contract or on both variables). 
Table 4: Influence of Remaining Contract Length and Transfer Fee System 
on Transfer Fees 
The following regressions test the empirical validity of Proposition 1. The dependent vari-
able is log standardized transfer fee. The estimation technique in (1) is OLS with robust 
standard errors (White (1980)) and the Heckman Two-Step Procedure in (2) where the in-
strument used is “tenure in the current club”. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Remaining Contract Years 0.0355*** 
(4.32) 
0.0354*** 
(4.82) 
Remaining Contract Years*Bosman 
Dummy 
0.0154** 
(2.49) 
0.0154** 
(2.53) 
Contract Duration in New Club -0.0019+ 
(-0.32) 
-0.0018+ 
(-0.36) 
Age 0.0280** 
(2.10) 
0.0279** 
(2.06) 
Age Squared‡ -0.0463* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0461* 
(-1.74) 
Number of Career Games Played‡ 0.0436*** 
(3.70) 
0.0430*** 
(3.40) 
Number of Career Games Played 
Squared‡‡ 
-0.0011*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.0011*** 
(-2.93) 
Semi-Professional# -0.0424+ 
(-1.51) 
-0.0421* 
(-1.93) 
Member of National Team# 0.0176** 
(2.07) 
0.0178** 
(2.06) 
Citizenship East European Country# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Citizenship Germany# -0.0149+ 
(-1.14) 
-0.0153+ 
(-1.27) 
Citizenship West European Country# 0.0192+ 
(1.47) 
0.0192+ 
(1.61) 
Citizenship Other Country# 0.0347*** 
(2.65) 
0.0347*** 
(2.82) 
Goalkeeper# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Defender# 0.0022+ 
(0.16) 
0.0031+ 
(0.20) 
Midfielder# 0.0081+ 
(0.62) 
0.0091+ 
(0.61) 
Forward# 0.0285** 
(2.16) 
0.0294* 
(1.90) 
Team Qualified for European Cup# 0.0420*** 
(5.47) 
0.0418*** 
(5.44) 
Mills Lambda - 
 
0.0037+ 
(0.20) 
Constant 0.4490** 
(2.53) 
0.4459** 
(2.58) 
Number of Observations 239 604 
Censored Observations - 365 
Uncensored Observation - 239 
F-Value 20.6 - 
R2*100 60.8 - 
LM-Test 0.4+ - 
Wald Chi Squared - 370.7*** 
 
‡ Coefficient multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes 
‡‡ Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 for presentational purposes 
# Dummy variable 
+ Not significant 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
Table 5: Influence of Remaining Contract Length and Transfer Fee System 
on Annual Wage in the New Club 
The following regressions test the empirical validity of Proposition 1. The dependent vari-
able is log standardized annual wage in the new club. The estimation technique in (1) is 
OLS with robust standard errors (White (1980)) and the Heckman Two-Step Procedure in 
(2) where the instrument used is “tenure in the current club”. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Remaining Contract Years -0.0195*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.0190*** 
(-4.40) 
Remaining Contract Years*Bosman 
Dummy 
0.0037+ 
(1.05) 
0.0034+ 
(0.98) 
Contract Duration in New Club 0.0042+ 
(1.25) 
0.0040+ 
(1.39) 
Transfer Fee Paid 0.5331*** 
(12.30) 
0.5338*** 
(14.62) 
Age 0.0040+ 
(0.50) 
0.0043+ 
(0.56) 
Age Squared‡ -0.0059+ 
(-0.38) 
-0.0066+ 
(-0.44) 
Number of Career Games Played‡ 0.0179** 
(2.39) 
0.0200*** 
(2.75) 
Number of Career Games Played 
Squared‡‡ 
-0.0003+ 
(-1.47) 
-0.0003+ 
(-1.47) 
Member of National Team# 0.0133** 
(2.55) 
0.0125*** 
(2.56) 
Semi-Professional# 0.0004+ 
(0.02) 
-0.0008+ 
(-0.06) 
Citizenship East European Country# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Citizenship Germany# 0.0067+ 
(0.92) 
0.0080+ 
(1.18) 
Citizenship Western European Country# 0.0110* 
(1.70) 
0.0111+ 
(1.63) 
Citizenship Other Country# -0.0016+ 
(-0.18) 
-0.0016+ 
(-0.23) 
Goalkeeper# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Defender# 0.0186** 
(2.00) 
0.0147* 
(1.65) 
Midfielder# 0.0258*** 
(2.84) 
0.0217*** 
(2.58) 
Forward# 0.0199** 
(2.16) 
0.0156* 
(1.77) 
Team Qualified for European Cup# 0.0112** 
(2.44) 
0.0121*** 
(2.64) 
Constant 0.3842*** 
(3.46) 
0.3971*** 
(4.03) 
Number of Observations 239 604 
Censored Observations - 365 
Uncensored Observations - 239 
F-Value 27.9 - 
R2*100 72.6 - 
LM-Test 0.03+ - 
Wald Chi Squared - 638.8*** 
 
‡ Coefficient multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes 
‡‡ Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 for presentational purposes 
# Dummy variable 
+ Not significant 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
Table 6: Influence of Transfer Fee System on Contract Length 
The following regression tests the empirical validity of proposition 2. The dependent vari-
able is the length of the individual contract. The estimation technique is a Random Effects 
Model. 
 
 (1) 
Bosman Dummy 0.5345*** 
(7.82) 
Age 0.0657+ 
(0.86) 
Age Squared -0.0030** 
(-2.17) 
Number of Career Games Played 0.0024** 
(2.38) 
Number of Career Games Played Squared‡ -0.0060*** 
(-2.36) 
Member of National Team# 0.3178*** 
(4.10) 
Home Grown Talent -0.3887*** 
(-3.12) 
Citizenship East European Country# reference 
category 
Citizenship Germany# -0.0165+ 
(-0.16) 
Citizenship West European Country# 0.0093+ 
(0.08) 
Citizenship Other Country -0.0207+ 
(-0.16) 
Goalkeeper# reference 
category 
Defender# -0.3284*** 
(-2.76) 
Midfielder# -0.1633+ 
(-1.42) 
Forward# -0.2233* 
(-1.79) 
Team Qualified for European Cup# 0.2253** 
(3.37) 
Log of Average Number of Tickets Sold 0.2708*** 
(3.95) 
Stadium Capacity Utilization -0.3301** 
(-1.99) 
Constant 0.2675+ 
(0.21) 
Number of Observations 975 
Number of Players 676 
Observations per Player 1-4 
R2*100 19.4 
Wald Chi Squared  217.4*** 
LM-Test 14.5*** 
Hausman-Test 36.2*** 
 
‡ Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 for presentational purposes 
# Dummy variable 
+ Not significant 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Since some individual characteristics of the players, such as nationality and position, are usually 
time-invariant, they can not be included in a fixed effects estimation. Therefore, we report the results 
of a random effects GLS regression instead. The most important coefficient in the present context (the 
Bosman-Dummy) remains unchanged in a fixed effects approach. 
Table 7: Influence of Contract Length and Transfer Fee System on the An-
nual Wage 
The following regressions test the empirical validity of proposition 3. The dependent vari-
able is the log Standardized Annual Wage in the current club. The estimation technique 
used is OLS with robust standard errors (White (1980)) in (1) and a Random Effects Model 
in (2). 
 
 (1) (2) 
Contract Duration 0.0077** 
(2.43) 
0.0050** 
(2.01) 
Contract Duration * Bosman Dummy 0.0044* 
(1.88) 
0.0059*** 
(3.61) 
Age 0.0256*** 
(4.62) 
0.0268*** 
(4.82) 
Age Squared‡ -0.0425*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.0445*** 
(-4.14) 
Number of Career Games Played‡ 0.0366*** 
(6.13) 
0.0363*** 
(6.01) 
Number of Career Games Played 
Squared‡‡ 
-0.0007*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.0007*** 
(-3.74) 
Member of National Team# 0.0289*** 
(6.56) 
0.0227*** 
(4.89) 
Semi-Professional# -0.0279** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0202** 
(-2.04) 
Citizenship East European Country# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Citizenship Germany# -0.0030+ 
(-0.50) 
-0.0098+ 
(-1.51) 
Citizenship West European Country# 0.0166** 
(2.45) 
0.0161** 
(2.21) 
Citizenship Other Countries# 0.0175** 
(2.17) 
0.0178** 
(2.29) 
Goalkeeper# reference 
category 
reference 
category 
Defender# 0.0080+ 
(1.22) 
0.0108+ 
(1.40) 
Midfielder# 0.0178*** 
(2.89) 
0.0201*** 
(2.77) 
Forward# 0.0223*** 
(3.35) 
0.0246*** 
(3.16) 
Team Qualified for European Cup# 0.0163*** 
(4.07) 
0.0134*** 
(3.76) 
Stadium Capacity Utilization 0.0363*** 
(3.66) 
0.0378*** 
(3.98) 
Constant 0.5137*** 
(7.17) 
0.5017*** 
(7.00) 
Number of Observations 604 604 
Number of Players - 477 
Observations per Player - 1-4 
F-Value 38.6 - 
R2*100 51.0 50.4 
Wald Chi Squared - 568.9*** 
LM-Test - 38.2*** 
Hausman-Test - 68.6*** 
 
‡ Coefficient multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes 
‡‡ Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 for presentational purposes 
# Dummy variable 
+ Not significant 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Since some individual characteristics of the players, such as nationality and position, are usually 
time-invariant, they can not be included in a fixed effects estimation. Therefore, we report the results 
of a random effects GLS regression instead. 
Table 8: Influence of Remaining Contract Length and Transfer Fee System 
on the Player Performance 
The following regressions test the empirical validity of proposition 4. The dependent vari-
able is the performance measure “kick-index”. The estimation technique used is a Random 
Effects Model. 
 
 (1) 
Remaining Contract Years 2.1516*** 
(3.65) 
Remaining Contract Years * Bosman 
Dummy 
-1.2089* 
(-1.84) 
Age 0.3880+ 
(0.34) 
Age Squared -0.0047+ 
(-0.22) 
Number of Career Games Played 0.0048+ 
(0.43) 
Number of Career Games Played Squared‡ -0.0088+ 
(-0.30) 
Member of National Team# 3.4903*** 
(4.56) 
Citizenship East European Country# reference 
category 
Citizenship Germany# 2.8316** 
(2.40) 
Citizenship West European Country# 3.3295** 
(2.49) 
Citizenship Other Countries# 2.6908* 
(1.79) 
Goalkeeper# reference 
category 
Defender# -6.0702*** 
(-4.34) 
Midfielder# -5.8396*** 
(-4.26) 
Forward# -7.9655*** 
(-5.41) 
Team Change Between Seasons -3.6428*** 
(-5.10) 
Stadium Capacity Utilization 3.0558* 
(1.70) 
Final League Position -0.5020*** 
(-7.10) 
Season 1999/00# reference 
category 
Season 1998/99# -0.2027+ 
(-0.26) 
Season 1997/98# -0.4716+ 
(-0.55) 
Season 1996/97# -1.4426+ 
(-1.54) 
Season 1995/96# -3.6861** 
(-2.07) 
Season 1994/95# -3.5289* 
(-1.83) 
Constant 65.9348*** 
(4.39) 
Number of Observations 741 
Number of Players 392 
Observations per Player 1-6 
R2*100 29.7 
Wald Chi Squared 237.6*** 
LM-Test 9.7*** 
Hausman-Text 85.4*** 
 
‡ Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 for presentational purposes 
# Dummy variable 
+ Not significant 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Since the grading of players has changed over the period under investigation, we include year dum-
mies in our estimate. Moreover, since some individual characteristics of the players, such as national-
ity and position, are usually time-invariant, they can not be included in a fixed effects estimation. 
Therefore, we report the results of a random effects GLS regression instead. 
 
 
 
